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INTRODUCTION
There is good news and bad news for those interested in responding to the Supreme
Court's recent course of  action in ways that would bring public policy back to where it
sat before  the Court's decisions.'  The good news is that the Court's decisions leave
open a significant number of routes to those public policy goals: The Court has said, in
I Copyright 2002  Mark Tushnet. All rights reserved.
*  Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. I refer  to  public  policy,  not  constitutional  law,  because  the  only  way  to  return
constitutional law back to some earlier point is to overrule the decisions that departed from the
prior ones, and I think it unprofitable to examine the prospects for such overrulings.INDIANA  LAW JOURNAL
effect, that Congress cannot get there by this route, but has not said that it cannot get
there at all. The bad news is that Congress will probably be unable to explore any of
the alternative routes.
There is good news and moderately bad news for those interested in pushing public
policy further in the direction the Court has moved. The good news is that, under the
right  conditions,  either  Congress  or the Court  itself might  be  able to  do  so.  The
moderately bad news is that there is no guarantee that those conditions will exist, and
some reason to think that they will not.
I ground the foregoing assertions on an analysis of the political  institutions of our
current constitutional order, and on an understanding of the opportunities afforded to,
and the limitations placed  on,  the Supreme  Court by any  constitutional  order, and
particularly  by the current  one.2  I begin  in Part  I by offering  a description  of the
Supreme Court's recent decisions as a less substantial repudiation of prior principles
than many think them to be, and as leaving Congress with the means to achieve a quite
substantial  proportion  of the  policy  goals  it  pursued  in  the  statutes  the  Court
invalidated. Part II explains why Congress is unlikely to do so, in light of our apparent
commitment to divided government, and parties that are organized around distinctive
ideologies because of divided government. Part III turns to the prospect for continued
policy  transformation,  identifying  the  conditions  under  which  either  the political
branches or the Supreme Court could pursue that transformation, and suggesting that
those conditions  are not highly  likely  to be realized. Part IV  is  a brief conclusion,
examining the implications of my argument for advocacy and scholarship.
I. THE SUPREME COURT, MODESTLY INTERPRETED
There  is by now  a large literature,  some of it represented by  and cited  in other
articles  in this Symposium, taking an alarmist view  of the Supreme Court's recent
decisions.3  These  decisions,  the  argument  goes,  foreshadow  a repudiation  of the
national commitment to national action to advance material well-being that occurred
during the New Deal  and was extended thereafter,  and the national commitment  to
national action in support of racial and other forms of equality that occurred during the
Great Society and was extended thereafter.
I think it is helpful to distinguish two ways of interpreting the Court's decisions.
Taking the decisions as settled precedent, we can ask, "How narrowly could a Court
faithful to the precedents  interpret them?" Alternatively,  we can ask, "How  broadly
might such a Court interpret them?"  I have deliberately used different verb forms in
these questions. The alarmist interpretation tends to be predictive, as the word "might"
2. My analysis draws on arguments developed in more detail in MARK TUSHNET,  THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONAL  ORDER  (forthcoming  2003).  A  few paragraphs  in what  follows  are drawn
almost directly from that book.
3. Lynn  A.  Baker  &  Mitchell  N.  Berman,  Getting off the Dole:  Why  the Court Should
Abandon Its Spending Doctrine and  How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It To Do So, 78
IND. L.J.  459 (2003);  Robert C.  Post & Reva B.  Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the
People: Juricentric Restrictions on  Section  5  Power, 78  IND.  L.J.  1 (2003);  Judith  Resnik,
Constricting Remedies:  The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78  IND. L.J.
223 (2003); Christopher  H.  Schroeder,  Environmental Law, Congress, and the Court's New
Federalism Doctrine, 78 IND. L.J. 413 (2003).
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suggests,4 while the interpretation  I offer in this Part simply identifies a possibility,
without committing the interpreter to the separate judgment that the possibility  will
probably  be realized.
I assume that readers are familiar with the Court's decisions, and therefore, instead
of describing the decisions in detail, I simply outline the ways in which the decisions
can fairly be given limited readings. I examine the Court's actions in several areas: the
scope of national power generally, including the scope of the Commerce Clause and
Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment;  state sovereignty
limitations  on  the  exercise  of national  power  when  that  power  otherwise  exists,
including rules of state immunity from liability and the anticommandeering principle;
and individual rights, including property rights and the right of expressive association.
In all these areas, the Court's decisions could  be given expansive  interpretations, but
need not be.
A. Federalism
The Court's federalism decisions fall into two broad categories: restrictions on the
scope of the power granted the national government in specific enumerations ofpower,
and state sovereign immunity limits that operate across all grants of power. In addition,
there are  the nondecisions,  the places where a Court bent on transforming national
power would have acted but has not, of which preemption and the spending power are
the primary examples.
1. Limits on Enumerated Powers
The modest view of the Court's decisions on the scope of the commerce power is
this:  Congress may  not justify regulating  an activity by showing that, taken in the
aggregate,  the activity  has substantial  effects  on  the national  economy,  unless the
activity itself can fairly be  characterized  as economic in nature.5 The Court has  not
limited  Congress's  power  to  regulate  activities  that  cross  state  lines  (even  if the
activities cannot be fairly characterized as economic in nature) by "regulat[ing] the use
of the channels of interstate  commerce.",6 An enormous swathe  of serious national
policy  falls  within  these two  rules.  In particular,  the  entire  regulatory  apparatus
associated with the New Deal, and most of the regulations associated with the Great
Society,  deal  with  activities  that  are  straightforwardly  economic  in  nature.  For
example, some applications of the Endangered Species Act might be unconstitutional
under  the Court's  decisions,  but  nearly  all of the  central  forms  of environmental
regulation are unaffected by those decisions.7
The Court has also held that Congress cannot "enforce" constitutional rights that the
4. For a discussion of  the predictive  aspect of the alarmist interpretation,  see infra Part II.
5. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.  549, 559-61  (1995).
6. Id. at 558.
7. See Maya R.  Moiseyev,  Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S.  Army
Corps of Engineers: The Clean Water Act Bypasses a  Commerce Clause  Challenge,  But Can the
Endangered  Species Act?, 7 HASTNGS W.-Nw. J.  ENVTL.  L. & POL'Y  191 (Winter  2001)  and
Robert  H. Bork,  Locating the Boundaries: The  Scope  of Congress's Power to  Regulate
Commerce, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 849, 888-90 (2002).
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Court itself would not recognize, although congressional enforcement mechanisms can
go somewhat beyond what the Court would do if those mechanisms were congruent
with and  proportional to the  scope of the constitutional  violations!  This is a more
serious limitation on achieving public policy goals than the Commerce Clause rule is.9
Yet, as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shows, a great deal of the activity that advocates
of constitutional rights care about-discrimination  in employment, for example-can
fairly be characterized as economic in nature, and therefore within Congress's power
to regulate interstate commerce, even if not within Congress's power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment.  One specific  area in which national policy is vulnerable is
statutory  prohibition of state policies that have an unintended but disparate  adverse
impact on protected classes, including racial minorities, women, and the disabled, in
connection with government activities that cannot be fairly characterized as economic
in nature,  such  as  the  operation  of polling  places  and  courthouses.  Beyond  that,
however,  it remains  possible  for  those  who  hold  expansive  visions  of what  the
Constitution truly requires can accomplish much of what they seek, albeit by invoking
Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce or some other congressional power
instead of Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. State Sovereignty Limitations
The modest view of the Court's state sovereign immunity decisions is this: The
decisions  limit the  remedies available  when  a state  government  violates national
policy, but they do not relieve state governments of their substantive obligations under
national statutes, which can be enforced by other means.'0 Private individuals may not
be  able  to sue the state government  itself for damages  or injunctions  requiring the
government to  comply  with national law, but the national government  can. I  I Even
more important, private individuals can sue the individuals charged with implementing
state law in a manner said to be inconsistent with national law, seeking an injunction
directing  them  to  comply  with  national  law. 1 2  The  ability  to  enforce  the  law
prospectively  is as strong as it has ever been.' 3 Limited resources for enforcement by
the national government mean that the Court's decisions undoubtedly  do reduce the
effectiveness  of formal enforcement mechanisms, by allowing state governments to
forego  complying with  national  law until  they  are directed  to do  so.  Yet  in many
instances, state governments face substantial political  pressure to comply with national
law: With respect to employment, for example, state employees often have unions with
8.  United States v. Morrison,  529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000); and  Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents,
528 U.S. 62,  80-81 (2000).
9. It also carries with it a certain amount of  ideological freight, affirming a strong version of
judicial supremacy and making it more difficult for advocates of expansive notions of civil rights
to obtain national policy predicated  on their articulation of civil rights, even if they can obtain
the substance of their desired policies by using some other enumerated power.
10.  Bd.  of Trs.  of Univ.  of Ala.  v.  Garrett,  531  U.S.  356,  376  (2001)  (Kennedy,  J.,
concurring).
11.  Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71  n.14 (1996).
12.Id.
13.  Cf Verizon  Md.,  Inc. v.  Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md.,  122  S.Ct. 1753,  1760-61  (2002)
(applying without questioning Exparte Young, 209 U.S.  123 (1908)).
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substantial  political  power,  and  in  other  contexts  such  as  nondiscrimination  in
providing  access  to  public  facilities,  locally  organized  interest  groups  can  place
pressure  on  state  governments  to comply  with the  national  laws  that  the national
counterparts of the local groups have helped enact.
To  assess  the overall  impact  of the modern  Court's decisions,  consider  a state
government that simply does not want to pay federally prescribed wages, or that does
not want to accommodate its disabled employees. It can pretty much guarantee itself a
free  ride  for  a while,  although  it may  face  adverse  political  consequences  from
mobilized unions or interest groups. The United States might sue on the employees'
behalf and recover the lost wages, but the national government devotes relatively few
resources to this type of enforcement action. Eventually, though, the state is going to
have to comply with national law, because eventually an employee is going to get an
injunction against  the  state's unlawful  conduct.' 4 The Court's sovereign immunity
decisions undoubtedly reduce the incentives states have to comply with national law,
and the decisions eliminate some remedies that Congress thought important in securing
state compliance.  Even so, the reduction in incentives does not ultimately undermine
the national government's ability to enforce its law, even in the federal courts, against
recalcitrant  states.
The  second  state  sovereignty  limitation  the  Court  has  imposed  is  the
anticommandeering  principle.  That principle  applies to a practice that, as the Court
accurately  said, was quite recent  and limited in scope. The principle's contours are
unclear precisely because there are so few cases invoking it. There are indications that
the principle does not apply when the state is regulated along with private actors.15 If
so,  it would be limited to regulations that affect the states  solely in their sovereign
capacities. And, although the Court clearly does not accept the view that the political
process  is sufficient  in itself to protect  states from  such regulations,  nonetheless  it
remains  true  that  the  political  process  places  substantial  limits  on  the  ability  of
Congress  to  commandeer  state  authorities  in  the  sense  the  Court  has  given  the
anticommandeering  principle.
3. The Court's Failures to Act: Preemption and the Spending Power
As I have argued elsewhere, the anticommandeering principle could be invoked to
place substantial limits on Congress's power to preempt state law.' 6 At least, one might
think that the federalism concerns  animating the Court's decisions on the  scope  of
national power and on state sovereignty  might induce the Court to find preemption
only rarely. Yet, this seems not to be the case. Nearly every preemption case the Court
14. The Court might hold that the remedies provided by the general wage-and-hour law were
intended to preclude reliance on Exparte Young suits to enforce that law. Cf. Luder v. Endicott,
253 F.3d 1020 (7th Cir. 2001)  (asserting, in a suit "under  the Fair Labor Standards Act,"  that
employees  did not  fit  within the Ex parte Young  doctrine).  Such  a  holding would  not  bar
Congress  from  making  it clear that  the Ex parte Young technique  was in fact  available  for
enforcement  of  the wage-and-hour laws.
15.  Reno  v.  Condon,  528 U.S.  141,  151  (2000)  (noting that the  challenged  statute was
"generally  applicable").
16. Mark Tushnet, Federalism  and International  Human Rights in the New Constitutional
Order,  47 WAYNE L. REv.  841  (2001).
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has  decided  recently  nods  in  the  direction  of an  asserted  presumption  against
preemption, but finds preemption anyway.' 7 The cynic would observe that the cases
typically involve efforts by litigants to invoke state law to impose greater obligations
on corporations  than federal  law imposes, and that the Court's decisions show that
when push comes to shove, the Court prefers corporations to states. A Court seriously
committed  to  a  revolution  in  federalism  would  have  done  more  in  the  area  of
preemption than the present Court has.
Perhaps more important, the Court has not yet imposed limits on Congress's power
to impose conditions on federal funds.18 Indeed, in the first anticommandeering case,
the  Court specifically  observed  that Congress  could  induce  state  compliance  with
federal  regulation  by  offering  the  states  money  on  condition  that  they  do  what
Congress wanted, even to the extent of getting the states to do what Congress tried to
commandeer  them to do.' 9 Using the spending power to induce compliance requires
that Congress expend money,  of course, but sometimes-perhaps  often-Congress
would appropriate the money anyway. The Court has not yet begun to examine limits
on the conditional  spending power,  and one can imagine  that the Court would find
some extreme invocations of that power unconstitutional. But, as with the commerce
power, the modest view outlined  in this Part would suggest that core applications of
the  conditional  spending power would remain  untouched by whatever doctrine  the
Court does develop.
4. Conclusion
Professor Edward Rubin has termed the modem Court's vision "puppy federalism":
"[L]ike puppy love, it looks somewhat authentic but does not reflect the intense desires
that give  the  real thing  its inherent  meaning.,
2 0  That  may be  a bit overstated, but
Professor Rubin's observation  is consistent with, and is supported  by, the modest
interpretation of the Court's decisions. The Justices in the Court's majority know what
an unconstitutional  statute is when they  see one, but they have not offered a larger
theory to explain why one statute is constitutional and another is not. Justice Kennedy
came as close as anyone in his opinion concurring in the Court's term limits decision.
21
The Constitution's  framers,  Justice Kennedy  said,  "split  the atom of sovereignty,"
assigning  some tasks to sovereign  states and some to the sovereign nation.
22 But, a
metaphor is not a theory.
17. See e.g.,  Egelhoff v. Egelhoffex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S.  141  (2001).
18.  Pierce County v. Guillen,  123  S.Ct.  720 (2003),  avoided deciding  whether  a federal
statute  was  outside  Congress's  power  under  the  Spending  Clause,  by  finding  the  statute
constitutional as an exercise of the power to regulate  interstate commerce.  Id. at 732 n. 9.
19. New York v. United States, 505 U.S.  144,  167 (1992) (discussing Congress's conditional
spending power).
20. Edward L. Rubin, Puppy Federalism and the Blessings ofAmerica, 574 ANNALs 37,  38
(2001).
21.  U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (Kennedy,  J., concurring).
22. Id.  at 838.
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B. Individual  Rights
Professor James Fleming has offered the best summary  of the Court's individual
rights agenda  in his  comment on  the Court's refusal  to find  that people  suffering
intense pain and nearing death did not have a constitutional right to obtain assistance in
committing suicide.23 The Court's precedents provided substantial support for finding
that the Constitution  did  guarantee  such  a right,  but the Court  refused to  push its
precedents  to that conclusion. 24 Professor Fleming observes  that the Court said, in
essence, "this far and no further."25 His conclusion suggests that the Court has nearly
reached the limit of  its understanding of individual rights. The Court seems to have an
aggressive individual rights agenda in two areas: property rights and free expression.
In both areas, the modest view would have it, the Court has moved in the direction of a
mild libertarianism that does not threaten to transform the modem regulatory  state.
1.  Property Rights
The modest view of the Court's regulatory takings decisions is this: First, the Court
has required that state and local governments  show a "nexus" between a condition it
places  on  a  request  for permission  to  develop  some  land  and  the  effects  of the
development itself.26 As with the decisions on Congress's power to regulate interstate
commerce,  these  decisions  undoubtedly  will  curb  some  excessively  enthusiastic
regulatory efforts. Demonstrating that the requisite nexus exists will increase the costs
of devising  the  regulations,  but  careful  design  already  attends  most  of the most
important  environmental  regulations.  Most  "smart  growth"  initiatives,  wetlands
preservation,  and historic preservation programs  can satisfy the nexus  requirement
without difficulty.
Second, land use regulations will be unconstitutional if they "go[] too far.",27 They
go too far either when they permanently deprive the landowner of all economically
beneficial use of the property, or when on balance the regulation's public benefits are
not substantial enough to justify the property's loss of value.28 Whether the property
loses all value depends on how we identify the property-referred to in the literature as
the "denominator"  problem, referring  to the  fact that we measure loss of economic
value by comparing the postregulation value (the numerator) to the preregulation value
(the denominator).29 The  Court has  been  notably  careful  in refusing  to  adopt  an
expansive definition of the denominator, and the cases suggest that the Constitution
does not require a denominator rule seriously adverse to state and local governments.3°
23.  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521  U.S. 702 (1997).
24. Id. at 719-20.
25. James E. Fleming, Fidelity,  Basic Liberties, and  the Specter  ofLochner, 41  WM. &  MARY
L. REv. 147,  152 (1999).
26. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.  825, 837 (1987).
27. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.  393, 415 (1922).
28. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,  533 U.S. 606, 617-18 (2001).
29. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,497 (1987).  The larger
the  denominator,  the smaller the  loss and the  less  likely  it is that  the government's  action
deprives the owner of all economic value.
30. See, e.g.,  Palazzolo,  533 U.S.  606 at 630-33.
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The Court's application of  the balancing test when a regulation impairs property value,
but does not eliminate it entirely, has been reasonably favorable to regulators as well.
Finally, it is worth noting that the Court has occasionally invoked other property-
rights-protecting  doctrines to  invalidate  legislation,  but in what the Justices in the
majority clearly thought were extreme cases.3  The exception  is the Court's decision
finding that interest on client funds in special state programs to finance legal services
for the  poor was property of the  client, and that  the programs  therefore  had to  be
analyzed under the Takings Clause.32 Notably, though, the Court has shied away from
addressing the constitutionality of rent control  statutes, which would seem  a prime
candidate for attention by a Court with an aggressive property rights agenda.
2. Free Expression
The  present  Court  is  a  First  Amendment  enthusiast.  The  dissolution  of  the
distinction between commercial speech, subject to substantial regulation, and political
speech, which could not readily be regulated, has made the First Amendment a darling
of corporate interests. In addition, large media enterprises have taken advantage of the
protection historically afforded small publishers. The modest view of the Court's free
speech decisions is this: Most of what the Court has done is consistent with the general
deregulatory  thrust  of modem  legislation;  the Court  has  either  mopped  up  after
legislatures,  or  has  paid  attention  to  small  regulatory  programs  that  escaped  the
deregulators'  attention. In either case, the Court's role in altering public policy has
been small.33
Probably the  most interesting  recent development  is the  invocation of a right of
expressive  association to protect the Boy Scouts from having to comply with a state
law  barring  discrimination  against  gays  and  lesbians  in  places  of  public
accommodation.34  The  Court's  doctrinal  articulation  of  the  right  of  expressive
association was quite broad: Courts had to defer to an organization's statement of the
views its members held and defer as well to the organization's assertion that requiring
it to refrain from discrimination would interfere with its ability to disseminate  those
3  1.  The modem Court's initial decisions dealing with the Obligation of Contracts Clause had
few  progeny.  For other cases  invalidating  statutes  on property rights  grounds,  see Eastern
Enterprises  v.  Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998),  Babbitt  v. Youpee, 519 U.S.  234 (1997),  and Hodel  v.
Irving,  481  U.S.  704 (1987).
32.  Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found.,  524 U.S.  156 (1998).  But see Wash. Legal  Found. v.
Legal  Found.  of Wash.,  122 S.Ct. 2355  (2002)  (granting  review  of a decision  holding  that
lawyers'  clients had no right to an injunction against the operation  of a plan using the interest
earned on their accounts to support a legal services program).
33.  The Court's position on campaign finance regulation might be another matter-if we
could be confident about what that position was. Its 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 425 U.S.
946 (1976),  plays a large role  in debates over campaign finance reform. Yet, no one  is really
confident that the present Court would follow Buckley, although whether it will reject Buckley to
make it easier to regulate campaign finance, or reject Buckley to make it more difficult to do so,
remains quite uncertain. Compare  Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S.
604 (1996)  (holding that the First Amendment prohibits applying campaign finance regulation to
political party expenditures), with Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't Pol. Action Comm., 528 U.S.  377
(2000) (upholding limitations on contributions in state campaigns).
34.  Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S.  640 (2000).
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views.35 Further, a group need not be organized solely for the purpose of expression to
be protected by the right of expressive association.36 In addition, the organization can
conduct some substantial commercial  activities, as does the Boy Scouts.
A  Court  truly aggressive  about  a right of expressive  association  could  use  the
doctrine as articulated in the Boy Scouts case to make large inroads on the application
of well-established  antidiscrimination  laws  to  many  businesses,  for,  as  Professor
Richard Epstein observes, "every organization engages in expressive activity when it
projects itself to its own members and to the rest of the world.' 37 Yet, the threat the
doctrine  poses  to  settled  law-antidiscrimination  law  in  its  core  applications-
indicates that the Boy Scouts case could be read narrowly. The most obvious limiting
rule would  be  that  only  nonprofit  organizations  can  assert  a  right  of expressive
association; one can imagine as well courts being less receptive to claims of a right of
expressive  association  when  asserted  in  defense  of  racial  and  perhaps  gender
discrimination, instead of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
3. Conclusion
The  right  of expressive  association  is  new,  and  the  Takings  Clause  is newly
invigorated.  Neither, however, has been  made  so robust  as to preclude  the modest
readings offered here.
C. Conclusion
Taken in the aggregate, the Court's decisions need place only slight limits on the
achievement of public policy goals. First, as  to federalism: Nothing  in the Court's
decisions threatens the core of the expansion of national power that occurred in the
New  Deal and afterwards,  which  confirmed that  the  national  government  had the
power to intervene extensively in the private sector to accomplish national economic
goals. The national government's ability to regulate state government actors directly,
when state governments  engage in economic activity, has been weakened slightly, as
the Court has reduced the  effectiveness  of the remedial  mechanisms  for enforcing
national  economic  policy.  Congress's  power  to define  violations  of constitutional
rights that go beyond what the Court is willing to recognize has been sharply limited,
but many such  rights violations can also be characterized  as implicating economic
activity, and therefore remain within Congress's power to regulate. Further, the Court
has as yet expressed no willingness to limit Congress's power to impose conditions on
state receipt of federal funds, even when the substance of those conditions could not be
imposed directly as a regulation on the states.
As to individual rights: The Court's most dramatic initiatives have been in the area
of property rights, but the decisions actually do not significantly impair state power to
regulate  the  uses  of private  property.  The  doctrinal  articulation  of the  right  of
expressive  association  was quite  expansive,  and could  be taken to  threaten  many
antidiscrimination laws, but it seems to me quite unlikely that the Court will invoke the
35. Id.  at 653.
36. Id. at 655.
37. Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional  Perils  of  Moderation:  The Case  of  the Boy Scouts,
74 S.  CAL. L. REv.  119,  140 (2000).
2003]INDIANA  LA WJOURNAL
right of expressive  association with respect to commercial  enterprises.  The present
Court might be described as mildly libertarian, but its very mildness indicates that its
individual rights agenda need not portend a return to the kind of expansive laissez-faire
view of government power contemporary  scholars associate with the Lochner era.
38
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF DIVIDED  GOVERNMENT
Undoubtedly some statutes presently on the books are vulnerable under the Court's
new constitutional jurisprudence;  in that sense  the Court's "revolution" has  not yet
ended.  Yet,  as  former  Solicitor  General  Seth  Waxman  has  observed:  "[M]odern
federalism  doctrine is being developed  at the expense of a series of enactments that
Congress passed at  a time when another paradigm-a  paradigm  of greater national
power-prevailed., 39 The modest reading  of the Court's decisions offered  in Part I
suggests  that Congress could  tinker around  the  edges of the statutes the Court has
invalidated  and reenact them in a form that would survive constitutional challenge.4 0
Waxman's observation  suggests a different point, though. The paradigm of national
power  he  referred  to  has  been  displaced  not  only  in  the  Supreme  Court,  but  in
Congress as well. While Congress could  reenact the statutes the Court has invalidated,
and enact new ones consistent with older views about the scope of national power, it
will not.
The reason lies in the structure of the political branches of  the national government.
The details  of that  structure  are complex,  but its outlines  are clear.41 The current
political system involves divided government, with each major party controlling only
one  branch  essential to  the  enactment of legislation. In addition,  elected  officials
confront each other across a divide that is not only partisan, but also rather ideological.
The consequences for public policy are that major  initiatives can be enacted only if
they have substantial bipartisan support, and that existing statutes cannot readily be
repealed.  No major legislative  revolution is  in prospect.  Divided  government  also
means that the Supreme Court has substantial  freedom to do what a majority wishes,
because in circumstances of divided government, whatever the Court does will "stick."
Yet, the Supreme Court is also part of the government as a whole, and it rarely gets out
of line with what is occurring in the political branches.  With no legislative revolution
likely, neither is a judicially led constitutional revolution.
38.  The association  is almost certainly  erroneous as  a matter of historical  fact,  but "the
Lochner era"  today  refers  less  to  a  particular  historical  period  than  to  an  approach  to
constitutional law.
39. Seth P. Waxman, Foreword:  Does the Solicitor General  Matter?, 53 STAN.  L. REV. 1115,
1120 (2001).
40. Congress has already reenacted the Gun Free School Zones Act, invalidated in United
States v. Lopez,  514 U.S.  549 (1995),  inserting a requirement  that the gun  possessed near a
school have once traveled in interstate commerce.  18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)  (2002). As far as I know,
prosecutors  have not pursued cases under the revised statute.
4  1.  I develop the reasons in more detail in TUSHNET,  supra note 2.
[Vol. 78:47RESPONDING TO THE REHNQUSIT COURT
A. Divided  Government
Political scientists agree that divided government characterizes the present period. 42
The reasons for divided government remain unclear, though. The easiest explanation is
that, although most voters prefer unified government,  enough voters  want divided
government to produce that result. In one formulation, voters "balanc[e] the policies or
ideologies  of  the  opposing  parties  by  placing  them  in  control  of  different
institutions., 43 This account confronts the difficulty that coordinating the preferences
for divided  government  in a  single election  is quite  difficult.  A  preference-based
account might explain why voters  chose Bill Clinton as President in  1992  and then
installed a Republican Congress in 1994, but providing such an account for the 1996
elections,  for  example,  is  quite  difficult:  Some  people  might  want  a  divided
government that has a Democratic President and a Republican Congress, while others
might want a divided  government  with  a Republican  President  and a Democratic
Congress, but unless things work out extremely well, they all might end up with the
same party controlling both branches."
For whatever reason,  divided government  does seem  a persistent  feature of the
present political  structure.45  As we now know,  of course,  the division  need not be
complete; it is enough that one party controls the presidency and the other controls one
house  of Congress. Indeed, with respect to the Senate, control  need not mean that a
party holds a majority of the seats. The past decade has seen a substantial increase in
the number of filibusters and quasi  filibusters, which  have produced a situation  in
which effective control requires sixty votes---enough to stop or forestall a filibuster-
rather than merely fifty-one.46
B. Ideologically  Polarized  Government
Divided government  itself might not have significant  policy effects, if coalitions
could form  and re-form  across party lines on different  issues. Divided government
does matter, though, when representatives  are ideologically opposed  as well.  And,
ideological division characterizes  the present political system.
42. The standard general account is MORRIS  FIORINA, DIVIDED  GOVERNMENT  (1996).
43. Id. at 72.
44. An alternative to preference-based accounts relies on structures alone, but the structure-
based accounts are quite complex and do not have the intuitive appeal that the preference-based
ones do.
45. Subject to a qualification discussed, infra, Part III.A. Mitchell Berman, commenting on a
draft of this Article, suggests that under some conditions persistent divided government, with
occasional  periods of unified government, can result from essentially  random processes.  The
conditions are that the parties enjoy close to equal popular support and (less importantly)  that
party discipline is weak so that a congressional candidate may hold views substantially different
from those hold by the party's presidential candidate. The question then would be what accounts
for changes in the differential support of  the parties,  with more equal division recently than in
the past, and in the strength of  party discipline. For a discussion of the latter issue, see TUSHNET,
supra  note 2.
46. In contrast, the internal rules of the House  of Representatives  give a party with even a
slim majority the ability to force a vote on proposals structured by the majority caucus.
2003]INDIANA  LA WJOURNAL
1.  Candidate selection
Years ago party leaders chose candidates for the House of Representatives and the
Senate. Their choices were determined by a range of factors, including but not limited
to ideology.  Today candidates  are chosen differently. In the first stage, a number of
people  simply  offer themselves  as candidates.  They need not  have undergone any
screening by party leaders or anyone else.  In the second stage, voters chose among
the self-nominated  candidates in party primary elections. Here, ideology plays a large
role,  because those  who  vote in party primaries  tend to be the more  ideologically
committed  of a party's membership. As  a result, Republican  candidates  tend to be
more  conservative  than their districts as  a whole, and  Democratic candidates  more
liberal.48 The composition of Congress then begins to polarize.
2. Districting
Polarization  is promoted  by  the increasing  ability of politicians  to  create  safe
districts by the use of computer programs that allow small blocs of uncongenial voters
to be shifted out of  a district while adhering to the Supreme Court's "one person, one
vote" rulings.49 According to one recent account, computer technology and partisan
apportionment  explain  why  the  number  of  competitive  races  for  the  House  of
Representatives in 2002  is one-quarter of  the number in 1992, and the number of  seats
that  switch  parties  has  been  cut  in  half over  the past  fifty  years.5 0  In  1998,  94
incumbents ran unopposed, and  114 had only nominal  opposition, primarily because
the districts were solidly in the hands of one party.5' Within relatively homogeneous
47. Self-nomination may produce a pool of potential candidates thicker with ideologically
committed people than does one created by nomination by leaders, because ideologues may offer
themselves as candidates more readily  than people with other motivations for public service.
48. This fact provides the basis for one of the more persuasive structural accounts of divided
government. Assume a district whose median voters are moderately conservative. They might
find the rather conservative  Republican candidate preferable to the extremely liberal one; yet
they  prefer  the  moderately  conservative  Democratic  presidential  nominee  to  the  more
conservative Republican one. For this model, see Bernard Grofman et al., A New Look at Split-
Ticket Outcomes for House and President:  The Comparative  Midpoints Model, 62 J. POL.  34
(2000).
49. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 633 (1964);  Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964);  Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S.  186 (1962).
50. John Harwood, House Incumbents Tap Census, Software to Get a Lock on Seats, WALL
ST. J., June  19, 2002,  at Al.
5  1. Jonathan  D. Salant, Number of Congressional  Candidates,  Funds Spent Down in  '98,
BULLETIN'S FRONTRUNNER,  Apr. 29, 1999,  LEXIS, Nexis Library,  FRNTRN File. This was a
near record. See PAUL S.  HERRNSON, CONGRESSIONAL  ELECTIONS: CAMPAIGNING AT HOME AND
IN WASHINGTON  31  (3d ed. 2000) (noting that the 1998 figure was "one fewer than the record set
in 1950"). For updated interim figures for 2002, see Allison Stevens, Number of Uncontested
Races Extremely High,  THE HILL, Apr. 24, 2002, available  at  http://www.hillnews.com/042402/
c2k2_uncontests.shtm  (last visited Jun. 24, 2002) (reporting forty-six  uncontested races as of
April 24, which projects to approximately fifty-five to sixty uncontested races for the November
elections).
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districts, representatives have to worry mostly about challenges from within the party,
and therefore about challenges to them on ideological grounds. 52
The case of the Senate is more complex and less well-understood.  The facts are
reasonably  clear.  The number  of states  having  one  Senator  from  each  party has
decreased substantially, from a peak of twenty-seven in 1976 to fourteen in 2002. One
suggestive  argument rests on the economics of migration.53 Taken in the aggregate,
people who move from one state to another tend to be wealthier than those who remain
in  a single  state,  and  people  who  tend  to  be  wealthier  tend to  be  Republicans.
Migration then leads the states receiving people to become more Republican and states
losing people to become more Democratic.
54
3. Congressional Rules
Self-nominated candidates owe nothing to the organized parties. Once they arrive in
Washington, they tend to pursue their own agendas, refusing to accept discipline from
party leaders.  Even so, the parties in Congress tend to polarize. In part, that occurs
because self-nominated candidates tend to share ideologies with others in their party:
They need not be organized by some external force like party leadership, because they
already agree with each other. Internal congressional rules  play an important part in
making the  congressional parties  act in even more polarized ways. 55 Members who
have  run  independently  of each  other  face  a collective  action  problem  in  getting
anything done, but they need to accomplish something if  they are to present themselves
to voters at the next election as successful legislators. Authorizing party leaders in the
House and Senate to  exercise substantial  power solves the coordination problem.
56
Common platforms like the Contract with America have the same effect, but perhaps
more  important  is  the  leadership's  ability  to  compose  legislative  packages  that
members vote for as a whole, and prescribe the rules authorizing--or, more important,
restricting-votes on amendments to proposals. These internal rules reduce the power
of the small remaining contingents of liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats
when the Republican or Democratic caucus organizes the House or the Senate.
52. But see HERRNSON, supra  note 51, at 30-32 (describing increasing  competition in House
races during the  1990s).
53. James G. Gimpel &  Jason E.  Schuknecht, Interstate  Migration  and  Electoral  Politics,  63
J. POL. 207 (2001).
54. In 2002, the Democratic Party of Virginia declined to nominate an official candidate to
oppose the reelection of Senator John Warner, the Democratic Party of  Kansas did the same with
respect to the reelection  of Senator Pat Roberts, and  Senator John Kerry  ran unopposed  for
reelection in Massachusetts, indicating that some of the patterns visible in House races can now
be found in Senate ones as well. According to one compilation, since  1982 Senators have run
unopposed  in 1984  (one Senator),  1990 (five  Senators), and  1992 (one  Senator).  HERRNSON,
supra note 51,  at 33.
55. Here I follow the argument of BARBARA  SINCLAIR, THE TRANSFORMATION  OF THE U.S.
SENATE (1989)  [hereinafter SINCLAIR, TRANSFORMATION]  and BARBARA  SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS,
LEADERS,  AND LAWMAKING:  THE U.S.  HOUSE OF  REPRESENTATIVES  IN THE POSTREFORM  ERA
(1995).
56. As Sinclair observes, these new rules invoke the "standard response" to collective action
problems of "plac[ing]  in the hands of leaders  selective  incentives that can be used to induce
institution-regarding behavior."  SINCLAIR,  TRANSFORMATION,  supra  note 55,  at 210.
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4. Conclusion
The explanation for ideologically polarized government is largely structural, unlike
the  preference-based  explanation  for divided government. The use of primaries  to
select candidates and the incentives on state legislators to respond to partisan concerns
in districting are likely to be permanent features of our political order, stable even if
voters change their preferences slightly.
C. Policy Outcomes in Ideologically Divided  Government
One  might  think that  ideologically  divided government  was a prescription  for
legislative  stalemate.  That  is not  quite  accurate,  though.  Some  new  laws  can  be
enacted, and the ones as to which there is stalemate have distinctive characteristics.
1.  Laws with High Bipartisan Support
Obviously a proposal that has substantial  support within both parties has a good
chance of enactment. Such proposals must be compatible  with both conservative and
liberal ideologies. Sometimes important proposals that are largely technical satisfy this
requirement.57 More interesting are important proposals that capitalize on the aspects
of individualism  that are common  to conservative and  liberal ideology. 58 Here,  the
primary example must be education:  To oversimplify,  conservatives favor education
programs over other forms of government action because they see education as giving
individuals the internal resources with which they can decide how they choose to live
their lives, and liberals  favor education  programs  because  they  see education  as a
means of self-realization.  Similarly, regulations  that  give  businesses incentives  to
comply with national policy without requiring them to do so are compatible with both
ideologies, although sometimes liberals will seek more directive regulation. Of course,
conservatives and liberals will divide over the details of programs  that invoke their
overlapping values, but the overlapping commitment to individualism opens the way to
agreement on some important legislation. 59
57.  For  example,  the  creation  of a  cabinet  position  for  internal  security  that  merely
consolidates existing agencies is, in my view, largely a technical matter. Yet, even the creation
of such a department was delayed substantially because of sharp partisan division over details.
58. It seems worth noting that the requirement of bipartisan agreement seems to preclude the
adoption of statutes that respond to perceived problems with the distribution of wealth, health
care, or other matters, that is, with the outcomes of market processes.
59. One subcategory of proposals with bipartisan support deserves attention. These are the
"feel  good"  statutes,  symbolized  in contemporary  constitutional  discourse  by  the Gun  Free
School Zones Act. Such statutes really have no important implications for public policy. They
are simple expressions  by members of Congress that they share their constituents'  concerns, not
serious public programs. I simply note that one should hardly get exercised by Supreme Court
decisions invalidating "feel  good" statutes: Precisely because such statutes have no significant
public policy implications, their invalidation has none either.
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2.  Small Initiatives
Divided ideological government gives partisans the power to obstruct enactment of
nearly anything. But, obstructionism is a weapon that is best used with respect to major
programs.  It  takes  time  and  effort  to  obstruct  the  legislative  process,  and  a
representative would try to do so only when, from the representative's point-of-view,
the cost is worth it. As a result, smaller initiatives might slip through the legislative
process. So, for example, one scholar suggests, "President's  [sic]  have most control
over small pet projects that they  personally  identify  with and push  early  in their
administrations.,
60  The  conclusion  seems  apt  with  respect  to  legislation  more
generally.61 I have referred to this phenomenon as the chastening of ambition in our
political system.62
3. Existing Programs
Divided ideological government means that few large new programs can be created.
It  also  means  that  old  ones  will remain  on the  books.  Here,  old means,  roughly,
enacted before the early 1990s. The important point to note here is that the persistence
of old statutes gives the Supreme Court the opportunity to play an important role in the
present system. As Waxman's observation suggests,63 it can do so by cleaning up the
statute books, invalidating statutes that could not be enacted today, and that will not be
reenacted in modified  form after invalidation. In addition, the Court has substantial
freedom  in interpreting  older statutes,  as  its recent activity in  connection  with the
Americans with Disabilities Act suggests. What the Justices say a statute means will be
what the statute means, even if the Court misinterprets the old statute, either from the
point of view of those who supported its enactment initially, or from the point of view
of what might be a contemporary  legislative majority.
Finally, to introduce a subject I discuss in more  detail in Part  III, the role of the
Court in interpreting old statutes is one reason why judicial appointments are likely to
receive particularly close scrutiny. Some legislators remain fond of older statutes, even
though they cannot enact any new programs, and will fear what a new Justice could do
to the statutes. Other legislators dislike those statutes, and will hope that a new Justice
will scale the  statutes back  or even strike  them down. Further,  the possibility  that
threatening  a filibuster could block a nomination means that a party with more than
forty  Senators-that  is,  both  parties--can  exercise  an  effective  veto  over
nominations. 64
60.  James  P.  Pfiffner,  Presidential Constraints and  Transitions, in  PRESIDENTIAL
POLICYMAKING: AN END-OF-CENTURY  ASSESSMENT  19,32 (Steven A. Shull ed., 1999) (emphasis
added).
61.  For a journalist's  comment on  the scope  of policy  proposals,  see Richard  L. Berke,
Following  Baby-Size Issues Into Voters'Hearts,  N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21,  1999,  at E 1.
62.  Mark  Tushnet,  Foreword: The  New  Constitutional Order and the Chastening of
Constitutional  Ambition, 113  HARV. L. REv.  29 (1999).
63.  See supra text accompanying note 39.
64. It is important to note that the veto can be exercised  behind the scenes. The filibuster
threat may  induce the President to submit a nomination  that will not  be filibustered,  and we
would not observe a filibuster occurring even though those who threatened to filibuster would
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D. The Supreme Court's  Position in Ideologically  Divided Government
In a world of divided government, the Supreme Court could do essentially anything
its majority wanted. Positive political theory makes clear what intuition suggests: In a
divided government,  courts  that are  significantly  more conservative  than the more
conservative  branch,  or more  liberal  than  the more  liberal branch,  can  follow the
judges' preferences without fearing that the legislature will retaliate against the judges
or overturn their decisions. The reason is that the courts'  opponents, who might form a
majority in one branch, cannot muster enough support in the other to act against the
courts.
This observation poses a puzzle for liberals upset by the Supreme Court's recent
decisions, who fear that what they have seen is no more than a pale foreshadowing of
more drastic moves to come. As I have indicated, the doctrinal materials for far more
substantial  actions  are  indeed  in  place.  The  Boy  Scouts  case65  and  the  Court's
Commerce Clause doctrine would authorize judges fairly applying the precedents to
invalidate core applications of  civil rights laws, for example.66 The puzzle is: why has
the Court not done so? Why have the Justices not wrought a truly major revolution in
constitutional doctrine, rather than taking small steps that might someday culminate in
a revolution?
Bruce Ackerman offers a strategic explanation for the Court's caution: The Justices
have picked their targets carefully,  refraining from invalidating "a  major statute in a
way that would catalyze a massive political reaction." 67 But, in a divided government,
no "massive political reaction" is likely against anything the Court does, because one
branch will support the Court's action.68 The freedom  afforded the Court in divided
government allows the Justices to pursue the agenda they actually have, and it seems a
stretch to assume that the Justices have some hidden agenda. A different understanding
of the Court's conduct emerges from a classic in the political science literature on the
Supreme Court, Robert A. Dahl's article on the Supreme Court as a decision maker in
a democracy.69 Dahl concluded that "the policy views dominant on the Court are never
for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of
the United States."7 0  From Dahl's perspective, there is nothing surprising about a Court
have effectively vetoed some other nominee.
65. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
66. For an argument that the Court has a larger agenda than expressed in its opinions so far,
see Jed Rubenfeld,  The Anti-Antidiscrimination  Agenda, I ll  YALE L.J.  1141  (2002).
67. Bruce Ackerman, OffBalance, in BUSH v. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY  192,  198
(Bruce Ackerman  ed., 2002).
68. Id.  Ackerman's position is  consistent with his distinctive normative-descriptive theory of
constitutional  change, which  is different  from the positive political theory on  which I rely  in
posing the question here.  Ackerman's general approach,  though not positive political  theory,
justifies his argument that, from the point of view of even quite conservative Justices, pursuing a
constitutional revolution now would be too soon.
69.  Robert  A. Dahl, Decision-Making  in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy Maker, 6 J. PUB.  L. 279 (1957),  reprinted  in 50 EMORY L.J. 563 (2001).
70. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making  in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy Maker, 50 EMORY L.J. 563,  570 (2001)  (originally published in 1957). Dahl offered the
more-or-less regular but intermittent process of appointing new Justices  as the mechanism by
which the Court was aligned with lawmaking majorities.
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behaving modestly during a period of divided government. The median Justice is likely
to be reasonably close to the median between the ideologically divided branches.7  Or,
put another way, within a government whose abilities are constrained by the balance of
political forces, the Supreme Court is likely to be less than revolutionary as well.72
E. Conclusion
The good news for people distressed at the direction they see the Court taking is
that what you see is what you get. Unless the Court's ideological makeup changes, the
Court is likely to continue drifting in a somewhat conservative direction. But, with the
same  qualification,  it  is  unlikely to  take  us  back  to  pre-New  Deal constitutional
doctrines, or to devise new, equally transformative constitutional doctrines. The future
is likely to be pretty much  like the past-unless something changes.  The next  Part
explores  the  possibilities  for  such  changes,  including  changes  in  the  Court's
ideological composition.
III. THE POLITICAL CONDITIONS  FOR TRANSFORMATION
Large  changes  in  fundamental  public  policy  might  occur  under  one  of three
conditions:  A briefly  unified  government, the  appointment of new  Supreme Court
Justices, or a government that remains unified for a long period because of presidential
leadership.
A. Briefly Unified Government
The  argument  that  we have  a  government  of chastened  ambition  rests  on the
proposition  that  we  have  committed  ourselves  to  divided  government.  But,  as  I
indicated, exactly why that is so remains unclear. In particular, coordinating choices to
assure that we continue to have divided government is difficult. Sometimes, almost by
accident, we might end up with a unified government. This is especially so when, as is
today true, the Nation and Congress are  split almost evenly,  because small,  perhaps
random events might have quite large consequences. As in the case of Senator James
Jeffords, a single member's shift of party allegiance (in that case, from the Republican
party to independent status) can change control of one chamber. That is an example of
a small change preserving  divided government, but equally small changes in a closely
divided Congress could create unified government, as the elections of  2002 may have
showed.
Of course if  the American people truly want divided government, we can reestablish it
at the next election. In the interim, however, a briefly unified government can enact
dramatic changes in public policy. The party controlling the government will use the
71. Under some circumstances, the median Justice might become significantly closer to one
of the ideological poles. For a discussion, see infra text accompanying note 72.
72. I emphasize that the version of Dahl's argument I present here holds that the Court's
modesty results from the actual preferences of its median Justice, not from fear by the Justices
that they face reprisal if they go too far. For a version of the latter argument (predicated, I note,
on an assumption that the Court's membership  will change), see Ackerman, supra note 67, at
207-09.
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opportunity to enact as much of its ideological program as it can, which is likely to be
quite  a bit. If divided  government  returns  after the  following  election,  the  newly
enacted  statutes  will remain  on the books,  because they  cannot  be  repealed  under
conditions  of divided  government. 73  The  political  system  operates  as  a  one-way
ratchet:  What  is done  under  unified government  cannot be undone  under  divided
government.
Briefly  unified  government  can  change  public  policy  dramatically,  working  a
revolution  in  public  policy  supported  only  by  a  narrow,  and perhaps  temporary,
majority.  This could  provoke  a  crisis  of stability,  as  those  who  lost  hold  of the
government find themselves back in control (or at least in control of one branch), and
yet unable to advance their own programs or even repeal their opponents'  programs.
The  frustration  occasioned  by  such  a situation  might  generate  unusual  modes  of
74 political action, of  the sort associated with crises.
A second source of crisis might be the Supreme Court. The party controlling the
government during a period of briefly unified government might be able to "pack" the
Supreme Court with its adherents.  Then, when  the other party  retakes  control, the
Supreme Court might be in a position to constitutionalize the programs enacted earlier,
insulating them  from  repeal  even through  ordinary  political  action.  I  believe this
course of events unlikely to materialize, though.75 Two conditions have to be satisfied:
The first unified government must have the opportunity to appoint enough Supreme
Court Justices to give  the Court an  ideological cast for the  long term, and the first
unified government must be replaced by a second one. Supreme Court nominations are
themselves almost random events, although a government's ideological  allies on the
Court can sometimes time their retirements  strategically. And, unified governments
come into being only through a conjunction of almost random events. The odds are
low that everything will fall into place in a way that would produce a constitutional
crisis by this route.
B. New Justices
Scholars  who  focus  on  the  Supreme  Court,  which  is  to  say,  almost  all  law
professors who discuss constitutional law, see the Court itself as a possible source of a
constitutional revolution. As I have argued, the Court as presently composed seems not
to be interested  in revolutionary transformation.  But, of course,  new Justices could
change the Court's preferences by fair readings of the precedents the modern Court has
already put in place that go far beyond the modest interpretations I have offered. Those
modest interpretations, it might be said, hang by a thread--or by the votes of one or
73. It is possible, of course, that a unified Republican government might replace a unified
Democratic one (or vice versa). Even then, however, repealing recent statutes might be unlikely
because of the effective  veto substantial  minorities in the Senate can exercise. See supra text
accompanying  note 46 (discussing the effective veto held by forty Senators).
74.  The  impeachment of President  William  Clinton might be  understood  as  this sort of
unusual form of political action, taken by Republicans frustrated  at their inability to enact the
programs  for which they believed they had been elected.
75. But see Ackerman, supra  note 67 (suggesting this possibility and arguing-in the terms
used in this Article-that Supreme Court vacancies should be held open until the persistence of
unified government is confirmed).
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* two Justices who could be replaced by more ideologically committed Justices when
today's Justices retire, resign, or die.
Whether  that possibility  will be realized depends  on  the politics of the modem
processes  of judicial  nomination  and confirmation.  Divided  government  strongly
affects both processes.
76
The Warren Court era made the politics ofjudicial appointments an important part
of politics generally because political leaders learned how courts can contribute to the
extension  and consolidation  of their political  programs. Interest groups have added
judicial nominations to their areas of concern, and some interest groups now take those
nominations as a primary area of interest for both lobbying and fund raising purposes.
Ideological polarization in divided government means that it becomes more likely than
before  that  a  nominee's  views  about  what  the  Constitution  means  will  differ
substantially  from  the  views  on the same question  held by  substantial numbers  of
Senators.77
What sorts of judges are  likely to be appointed to the federal  courts  in the new
constitutional  order  of  divided  government  and  highly  partisan  and  polarized
Congresses?  The run  of Supreme  Court  nominations  from  Robert  Bork  through
Stephen  Breyer suggests the answer. A high profile  nomination is likely  to be quite
costly politically, at least when different parties control the presidency and the Senate.
The opposition party in the Senate may be able to convert a nomination into a political
issue that can damage the President and his party, even if the Senate and the President
are from the same party.
We can see something of a learning curve in recent appointments. The nomination
of Robert  Bork,  a  highly  qualified,  strongly  ideological  figure with  well-known
positions on many issues, failed and taught liberal interest groups how they could use
judicial nominations as a means of more general political organizing. The nomination
of Clarence  Thomas,  known to be ideological  but with some special  demographic
appeal, succeeded, but the success imposed a fairly high political cost on the President
who  nominated  him.7 8  The  nomination  of David  Souter,  whose  positions  were
unknown when he was nominated, succeeded, but Souter's performance  as a Justice
taught conservatives that they could not rely on reassurances that a nominee without a
76. The argument that follows draws heavily on LAUREN COHEN BELL, WARRING  FACTIONS:
INTEREST GROUPS,  MONEY, AND THE NEW  POLITICS OF  SENATE CONFIRMATION  (2002); MARK
SILVERSTEIN,  JUDICIOUS  CHOICES:  THE  NEW  POLITICS  OF  SUPREME  COURT  CONFIRMATIONS
(1994);  and  DAVID  ALISTAIR  YALOF,  PURSUIT OF JUSTICES:  PRESIDENTIAL  POLITICS AND THE
SELECTON OF SUPREME  COURT NOMINEES (1999).
77. A nominee's opponents have sometimes searched out what they presented as personal
failings to justify their opposition,  and sometimes  presented what  the nominee's supporters
regarded  as  distorted characterizations  of the nominee's views. I believe  that this so-called
politics of personal destruction has begun to change into one in which Senators explicitly and
unabashedly take a nominee's ideology  into account. (An e-mail exchange with Keith Gardner
Whittington, Professor of Politics at Princeton University, helped me clarify this point.)  For a
normative analysis of these developments, see Charles G. Geyh, Judicial  Independence,  Judicial
Accountability, and  the Role of  Constitutional  Norms in Congressional  Regulation of  the Courts,
78 IND. L.J.  153 (2003).
78.  It is generally  said, for example, that President George H.W.  Bush had to sign a civil
rights  bill  that he  had  previously  vetoed,  to reduce  the  impression  caused  by  the Thomas
nomination that Bush was opposed to civil rights.
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substantial  public record would be a conservative after appointment.  .-i
A  reasonably  risk-averse  President  and  Senators  will  strongly  prefer  bland
nominees:  "The  constellation  of political  and  legal  forces  at  work  in the  nation
virtually guarantees a potentially powerful opposition in response to any nomination,
and thus  the  modem  president  is  compelled  to  seek  out  nominees  who  present
characteristics  certain to  forestall,  or at least  minimize, this opposition.,
79 The so-
called "stealth nominee,"  who lacks  a substantial  record that opponents can attack,
should be the characteristic nominee in the present political system. And yet, the case
of Justice  Souter  indicates  that although  stealth  nominees  may escape  substantial
challenge from the President's opponents, they may not be sufficiently reliable, at least
openly so, to satisfy the President's supporters. Even worse, consider the reaction of
the opposition party to a stealth nominee: The very fact that the President's supporters
are willing to tolerate the nominee after the Souter experience will demonstrate to the
opposition that the President's supporters must have enough information to reassure
them in the face of a thin public record.80
Presidents  may sometimes  calculate that the  benefits  of making  a controversial
nomination, for example in satisfying an important constituency,8 1 exceed the costs of
attracting  opposition,  but those costs  are  likely  to lead  Presidents  to make  such a
nomination  only  rarely.  Under  the  right  circumstances,  a  Republican  President
supported by a Republican Senate, and perhaps even one facing a Democratic Senate,
might be able  to push through  some strikingly conservative nominees to the federal
courts, and even to the Supreme Court.
We  can see the difficulties,  and possibilities,  by  examining the suggestion  that
President George W. Bush could nominate a reasonably conservative Hispanic judge
or former judge  to  the  Supreme  Court.  Liberal  interest  groups  learned  from  the
Thomas nomination that they have to be quite careful about a nominee with specific
demographic appeal, but they might be unable to muster enough opposition to block
the nomination.82 Even  a Hispanic nominee with a publicly perceptible  position  in
favor of restricting abortion rights would face substantial opposition from Democratic-
leaning women's groups. And yet, the President's conservative supporters themselves
79.  SILVERSTEIN,  supra note 76,  at 100.
80.  What is the best pool from which to choose a nominee? Sitting judges who, as political
scientist  David  Yalof puts  it,  "chart  a course  of moderation"  in  which  any  controversial
decisions  can be explained away by saying that the judge had  to follow the Supreme Court's
dictates.  YALOF, supra note 76,  at  171.  A sitting judge nominated for the Supreme Court, and
even more so the President, can suggest without quite saying so that the nominee's own views
might be different from the Supreme Court decisions that forced the nominee to decide the case
in  a controversial  way.  Politicians  and  law  professors,  in contrast,  achieve  prominence  by
confronting highly controversial issues, which is precisely why Presidents shy away from such
nominations.
81.  Silverstein argues, for example, that President George Bush "reward[ed]  ...  the right
wing of  the party ...  [with] judicial appointments."  SILVERSTEIN,  supra note 76,  at 124.
82. Shortly after Bush took office, liberal interest groups focused on the Court began to build
the case against confirming any Bush nominee: They argued that the conservative Justices who,
in their eyes, put Bush in office  should not be able effectively to select their own successors.
That strategy  probably would not succeed, but it indicates that Democratic  interest groups are
not likely to treat Supreme Court nominations as political deals in which one constituency can be
"bought off' by  simple identity politics.
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are  not  comfortable with  a  stealth nominee,  having  taken as  a  slogan,  "No more
Souiers." The President must choose someone with no visible position on abortion, and
then assure his conservative supporters that the nominee is not another David Souter,
while simultaneously avoiding stirring up serious opposition precisely because, on the
abortion  issue, the  nominee  is indeed  not another David Souter.  This is a delicate
political task, and even minor stumbles are likely  to make the choice quite costly in
political  terms. Those  political costs are  likely  to be  high, but they may be worth
bearing,  particularly  if the  nomination  occurs  well  before  the  President  seeks
reelection.s3
The hypothetical nomination I have described deals with the political circumstances
of a particular President, but its outlines arise from the general characteristics of the
present political system.s4 Interest group attention to the Supreme Court coupled with
divided  government  makes  it  unlikely-not  impossible,  but unlikely-that  new
Justices  will  be  interested  in  revolutionizing  constitutional  doctrine  rather  than
chastening  it.
C. Presidential  Leadership
The events of September  11,  2001,  and their aftermath made clear a third route to
constitutional transformation. Presidential leadership in times of  crisis has always been
important, and perhaps  has been the central  element, in transforming  our political
system.  Presidents who guide the nation to a new constitutional system succeed in the
short run on three levels, and succeed in the long run on a fourth. Rhetorically, they
articulate for the nation a new constitutional vision around which the nation can come
together.  Politically,  they  obtain  from  Congress  laws  that  implement  that  vision.
Programmatically,  the  statutes  they  put  in  place  are  seen  to  solve  or  at  least
substantially mitigate the problems to which they were addressed. For the longer term,
successful  political  leaders  begin to  construct  a new  institutional  structure  within
which day-to-day political contention occurs.
The combination of rhetorical with programmatic success matters most. The cases
of President Ronald Reagan and Representative Newt Gingrich show that leaders who
do  indeed  clearly  articulate  visions  that  many  in  the  public  find  attractive  may
nonetheless  fail  to transform  the  political  order  as  they  hope. The  reason  for the
incomplete transformation  during  the Reagan  presidency  is that  rhetoric must  be
accompanied  by political  and programmatic  success.  Even more dramatically  than
President  Reagan,  Representative  Gingrich  was  unable  to  accommodate  a
83. This may be particularly true when the Court is closely divided and a single appointment
might be thought likely to have substantial long-term effects. Under those conditions, of course,
the opposition to the nomination is likely to be particularly  intense as well.
84.  A  similar analysis is available, I believe,  of a hypothesized  nomination  of a sitting
Senator.  The decay of norms of senatorial deference  coupled with the rise of interest group
attention  to judicial  nominations  makes  it less likely  than in the past that the President  can
assume that such a nomination, particularly of  a Senator with a clear ideological position (which
is to say, virtually any Senator), would sail through to confirmation. Confirmation is possible,
but is likely to come with substantial political costs.
85.  The  classic  work  is now  STEPHEN  SKOWRONEK,  THE  POLITICS  PRESIDENTS  MAKE:
LEADERSHIP  FROM JOHN  ADAMS  TO  GEORGE  BUSH (1993),  which  has deeply  influenced  my
analysis, even though I do not cite it for specific points in what follows.
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transformative  program to the existing reality of governing structures  in a way that
allowed him to push the program forward. Even political success joined with rhetorical
leadership may not be enough. The policies a President persuades Congress to adopt
must  be seen to work, that is, to advance the nation in the direction the President's
vision has identified.
These observations have obvious implications for the possibilities opened up by the
terrorist attacks of September  11,  2001. President George W. Bush occupies the office
in a period of crisis under several  disadvantages.  There is a crisis, but it is not the
one-of economic  stagnation-that  produced  the  initial  successes  of the  Reagan
revolution,  and it is not something that was the focus of public attention during the
2000 presidential campaign. Partisan Democrats have misgivings about the manner in
which President Bush came to occupy the office. Perhaps most problematic, he became
the Republican candidate for the presidency precisely because he did not articulate a
strong ideological vision, but rather because he was seen as the Republican candidate
most likely to blur ideological  differences with the Democrats.
Even  so,  President  Bush  might  be  able  to  implement  the  Reagan-Gingrich
revolution  more effectively  than  its  initiators.  His  task is  to  use  the  opportunity
provided  by  the  present crisis  to  tie the  Reagan-Gingrich  principles  to the  crisis,
thereby  rearticulating  them  for  a  public  that  did  not  accept  them  in  their  first
incarnation. Relying on President Bush's first State of the Union address, E.J. Dionne,
Jr.,  a  liberal  columnist,  suggested  the  direction  in  which  President  Bush  might
transform policy.86 According to Dionne, Bush combined conservatives'  defense of  the
free  market  with  a  traditionalist's  interest  in  securing  the  conditions  of moral
development through the use of public power to nurture the institutions of civil society
that help people understand their personal  responsibility for personal  and economic
success. Tax cuts and reductions in the scope of existing regulation represent the first
element, while faith-based  public programs, improvements in education that include,
but are not limited to, vouchers for use in private schools, and government programs
that support volunteer activities, represent the second. The speech did not, however,
closely  tie  these principles  to the war  on  terrorism,  and  it remains  unclear  to me
whether President Bush is interested in doing so. Yet, connecting these programs to the
rhetoric  made  available  by  the  events  of September  11,  2001  seems  to  me quite
important if President Bush is to succeed in transforming the political system.
The glimmerings  of new  institutional  arrangements  can be  seen. Picking  up  on
themes stated during the Reagan presidency, the Bush administration has asserted its
interest  in establishing  the  constitutional  independence  of a strong  presidency.  It
limited disclosure of presidential records and resisted disclosure of vice-presidential
contacts with officials of energy-related companies. Its initial version of  a proposal for
military  tribunals  for noncitizens  held  for terrorist activities  would  have kept  the
ordinary courts out of the process entirely. In at least this respect, we can see the Bush
administration's  interest  in developing  a new  institutional  arrangement  for a new
constitutional  order.87
The crisis provides the opportunity for this rearticulation and shift in conservative
86. E.J.  Dionne, Jr., Conservatism Recast, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2002,  at B i.
87. The President's effective selection of the present Senate Majority Leader is  another hint
at a new institutional arrangement.
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principles and institutions, cast once again in the rhetoric of  war and given structure by
the process of crafting public appeals through political technology. At this writing, it is
of course too early to know whether President Bush's rhetoric will succeed, whether he
:will accommodate enough in politics to achieve his political goals, whether the policies
that  are  enacted  will  be  seen  to  succeed,  and  what  the  distinctive  institutional
characteristics of a newer constitutional order would be.
Still, if President Bush succeeds programmatically, in developing and implementing
policies  that  are  seen  to  respond  well  to  the perceived crisis,  and  rhetorically,  in
articulating a grander ideological vision that explains why new regime principles are
suited to the new situation, the U.S.  political system  could be transformed into  one
committed  in  principle  to  a  sharply  reduced  role  for  government  in  supporting
economic growth and achieving economic and social Justice.
How  might  that  occur?  Consider  a  scenario  with two  parts.  A  President  who
succeeds programmatically and rhetorically would be in a position to go to the country
in the 2004 elections as the leader of a unified ideological  party, and might help his
party  gain solid  control  of Congress.  A full-scale  repudiation  of New  Deal/Great
Society principles might then occur, symbolized by a substantial privatization of the
U.S.  system of pensions for the elderly. The second part of the scenario involves the
Supreme  Court.  I  have  argued  that,  under  the  conditions  that  prevailed  before
September  11,  President Bush would face a difficult political choice when given the
opportunity  to  nominate  a  Supreme  Court  Justice.  Under  the  circumstances
immediately after September 11,  his choice would be easy: Select the uncontroversial,
bland  stealth nominee. Under the circumstances  that might prevail if he becomes  a
transformational  leader,  his choice would also  be easy,  but precisely the opposite:
Select the committed ideologue. The Supreme Court then could assist the new unified
government  by  cleansing  the  statute  books  of legislation  left  over  from  the  prior
system.88
D. Conclusion
Liberals are right to see in the present Supreme Court's decisions the possibility of
constitutional transformation. And, of course, the American people might decide that
such  a transformation  is  a good thing.  This  Part  has  identified the  conditions  for
88. Indeed the doctrinal materials are available for the Court to push in new directions.  The
Court has held that some education voucher systems may include vouchers for use at religiously
affiliated schools. Zelman v.  Simmons-Harris,  122  S. Ct. 2460 (2002). I can  imagine a court
taking the next step and holding that such systems must include those schools, because excluding
them would be discrimination of  the basis on the content of  the instruction they offer, a violation
of free speech principles. And, I can imagine a third, more dramatic  step, a holding that states
must establish voucher  systems. A sketch of  the argument is  that parents have a constitutional
right to send their children  to private  schools,  whether  religiously affiliated  or not, and that
voucher systems are necessary to ensure that this option is truly available  to parents. Another
possibility is that the Court might hold it unconstitutional  to have a Social Security system that
does not provide individuals with some opportunity to determine how their retirement savings
will  be  invested-that  is,  a  partial  privatization  of  Social  Security  as  a  constitutional
requirement.  Here  the  argument  would develop  from some  of the  modem  Court's  takings
doctrine.
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constitutional transformation, and has argued that the possibility that those conditions
will be satisfied, while not nonexistent, is smaller than liberal alarmists think. 9
The scenarios described in Part III.C are realistic ones, and more realistic than they
were a year or two ago. Still, they remain less realistic than the modest interpretation
of the present political system that I have offered. Consider the keystone legislation of
the New Deal/Great Society constitutional order: Social Security, the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the  environmental  legislation of the  1970s. I think it wholly unrealistic  to
imagine  that  even  a  unified  conservative  Congress  would  repudiate  the  national
commitments those statutes represent. Of course there would be tinkering at the edges,
and substantially  less enforcement by the national government, including the courts,
than the most ardent environmentalists and civil rights advocates would like. And, of
course  there  would  be  serious  contention  over  what  precisely  the  normative
commitments  made  by  those  statutes  were:  How  clean  must clean  water be?  Is
affirmative  action consistent with or contrary to principles of  equal opportunity? But,
the normative commitments-to a livable environment and to equal opportunity-will,
I believe, remain unquestioned.
The  possibilities  for judicially  led  transformation  exist  as  well,  but  it  would
certainly take time for the lines of precedent to develop to the point where the Court
could comprehensively implement a new constitutional vision. Indeed, in some ways it
is easier to imagine a Court overruling the decisions that validated the New Deal/Great
Society constitutional order than it is to imagine it moving in an entirely new direction.
But,  as  I have  argued,  as  a  political  matter  it  seems  unlikely  that  even  a newer
constitutional order would repudiate the keystones of  the earlier one. In short, we have,
and are likely to continue to have, a political system with chastened ambitions.
IV. CONCLUSION:  IMPLICATIONS FOR ADVOCACY AND SCHOLARSHIP
What  are the  implications  of the  foregoing  description  of the present  political
system?9 0  I doubt that the present  system leaves much room  for creative  advocacy
directed  at the courts by the liberal side. Ingenious arguments are unlikely to change
the minds of today's Justices. The Court's liberals do not need to be told that some
new way of thinking about the Constitution will lead to liberal conclusions; for them,
the  old  ways of thinking  do  so anyway.  And, the Court's  conservatives  will  not
suddenly see the light when presented with a new way of thinking that, it is said, leads
to liberal conclusions.9' What advocates should do is pretty much slog along with the
89. Liberal alarmism might be a useful strategy for mobilizing supporters, precisely to ensure
that the conditions for constitutional transformation will not in fact be satisfied. For example, it
clearly helps in mobilizing opposition to a Supreme Court nomination to urge forcefully that the
Court is only a single vote away  from being able to work a constitutional revolution.
90. The following paragraphs are strongly influenced by Mark A.  Graber, Rethinking Equal
Protection  in Dark Times, 4 U. PA. J.  CONST. L. 314 (2002).
9  1. My  favorite example  (so  far) of misplaced  scholarly efforts, if it be understood  as an
effort at advocacy directed at the courts, is Robert C.  Post &  Reva B. Siegel, Equal  Protection
By Law: Federal  Antidiscrimination  Legislation  After Morrison,  110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000). As
Professor  Graber  puts  it,  "Rather  than  trying to  convince  Justice  Scalia  to think  more  like
Professor  Ronald  Dworkin,  progressives  should  spend  more  energy  doing  the  political
organizing necessary for ensuring  that when Justice  Scalia retires he will be replaced by a
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-standard tools of doctrinal  argument,  liberals  pressing the  courts to  adopt  modest
interpretations of the Supreme Court's recent decisions and conservatives urging the
courts to push those decisions more vigorously in a conservative direction.
92
.: Legislative advocacy  is both similar and different. Advocates of new statutes can
?urge  Congress to do almost anything, which is why legislative advocacy is different,
and explain to legislators, who might think that the Supreme Court stands in their way,
that the decisions, properly  interpreted, in fact do not stand in the way, which is why
legislative  advocacy  is  similar.  Of  course  advocates  of  substantial  innovative
legislation should not expect much to come of their efforts until the political system
changes.  But,  advocating  large  changes  can  lead  to  small  ones  with  which  the
advocates might be pleased.
The implications for scholars  are,  I think, more  interesting. Working  within the
outlines of existing law is likely to be extremely boring, because the lines of argument
are well-known.
93 What might be valuable are works pushing the envelope. One model
here might be conservative scholarship  of the  1970s and  1980s. As  Professor Jack
Balkin has said in a slightly different context, the sensible reaction to that scholarship
when written was that it was, well,  crazy.94 Or, to use a less pejorative term, it was
utopian, having only the most remote connection to what seemed possible within the
political and legal system as then contoured.
Conservative  scholars  now  have  the luxury of being  realistic.  Liberal  scholars
should  be utopian.9 5  They  should  propose new  statutes  that  have  no  prospect  of
adoption in the foreseeable future and articulate constitutional doctrines that would
both  defend  the  constitutionality  of  such  statutes  and  provide  support  for  the
proposition that enacting such statutes is mandated by the Constitution.9 6
Justice who thinks more like Professor Dworkin." Graber, supra note 90,  at 322.
92. As Professor Graber notes, "The seminal article in this tradition [written from the liberal
side] is Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion Politics:  Writingfor  an Audience of
One, 138 U. PA. L.  REv.  119 (1989)."  Graber, supra note 90, at 325 n.47.
93. Would anyone with an ambitious young scholar's best interests at heart advise the scholar
today to write an article on the proper interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment?
94. Jack M.  Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary  Between Law and  Politics, I 10 YALE
L.J.  1407,  1446 (2001).
95. See Graber, supra  note 90, at 334 (describing a strategy of constructing a "constitution-
in-exile").
96. For myself, a good place  to begin would  be with arguments about the constitutional
imperative of social welfare rights. Showing that utopianism need not be a pursuit solely for the
young, see CHARLES L. BLACK,  JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN  RIGHTS,  NAMED  AND
UNNAMED  (1997)  (arguing for a constitutionally mandated set of  social welfare rights). Graber,
supra note 90, at 349, argues that progressives'  constitution-in-exile should be "judged by their
capacity to be  vehicles for  bringing down  the incumbent center-right  regime,"  and that this
judgment will depend on an assessment of whether that regime is relatively durable, as I have
argued it is, or whether  it might be displaced  by a progressive movement  energized by,  for
example, "a more charismatic candidate." If my assessment is right, utopian proposals may do
well even under Graber's standard.
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